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QUALITEX CO. v. JACOBSON PRODUCTS
CO.: ORANGE YOU SORRY THE SUPREME
COURT PROTECTED COLOR?
Trademarks are vital to fair competition in the market-
place.' Their existence protects owners from unfair practices of
competitors and facilitates informed consumer choice between
otherwise indistinguishable goods.2 In 1946, Congress recog-
nized the need for uniform federal trademark law and enacted
the Lanham Trademark Act ("Lanham Act")3 to guard against
unfair competition in the marketplace.4 The Supreme Court's
recent interpretation of the Lanham Act in Qualitex Co. v. Ja-
cobson Products Co.,' however, may result in unfair competition
'See In re Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 774 F.2d 1116, 1123 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(citing S. REP No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1946), reprinted in 1946
U.S.C.C.A.A.N. 1274, 1275 (indicating trademarks are essence of competition
"because they make possible a choice between competing articles ... "); Rohm & Haas
Co. v. C.P. Hall Co., 105 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 155, 158 (Comm'r of Pat. 1955) (noting
trademarks are essence of competition and "rights in them may not be asserted
broadly to stifle competition ..."). Rather than granting a monopoly, trademark law
recognizes "a fundamental right to compete through imitation of a competitor's
product, which right can only be temporarily denied by the patent or copyright
laws." Brunswick Corp. v. British Seagull Ltd., 35 F.3d 1527, 1530 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
(citing In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1336 (C.C.P.A. 1982)), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 1426 (1995).
2 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994) (defining trademark as "any word, name, symbol, or de-
vice" used to identify and distinguish goods from those sold by others); see, e.g., Park
'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 198 (1985) (noting that
trademarks "protect the ability of consumers to distinguish among competing pro-
ducers"); United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97-98 (1918)
(opining that trademarks create distinguishing marks on products); Owens-Corning,
774 F.2d at 1123 (finding that trademarks indicate origin of goods to consumers).
3 Lanham Trademark Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1994).
4 See S. REP. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1946), reprinted in 1946
U.S.C.C.A.A.N. 1274, 1275 ("To protect trademarks, therefore, is to protect the pub-
lic from deceit, to foster fair competition, and to secure to the business community
the advantages of reputation and good will by preventing their diversion from those
who have created them to those who have not."); see also Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco
Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992) (noting that Lanham Act was intended to
protect persons engaged in commerce against unfair competition); Park WN Fly, 469
U.S. at 198 (indicating that Lanham Act secures protection of trademark owners'
good will in business).
5 115 S. Ct. 1300 (1995).
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since permitting manufacturers to trademark color alone will
preclude others from using the protected color on competing
products.'
In Qualitex, the Supreme Court addressed whether the Lan-
ham Act permits the registration of a trademark consisting,
"purely and simply," of a color.7 The petitioner, Qualitex Co.,
used a particular shade of green-gold on its dry cleaning press
pads since 1957.8 In 1989, Jacobson Products, a Qualitex com-
petitor, began manufacturing and distributing an inferior quality
press pad9 in a very similar green-gold color.10 In 1991, Qualitex
registered the green-gold color of its press pads as a trademark."
6Id. at 1308 (stating that "color may sometimes meet the basic legal requirements
for use as a trademark ...").
7 Id. at 1302.
8 Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 13 F.3d 1297, 1300 (9th Cir. 1994), rev'd,
115 S. Ct. 1300 (1995); see Susan Upton Douglass, Color Me Happy: The Supreme
Court Rules on the Trademark Registrability of Color, 7 No. 5 J. PROPRIETARY RTs.
2 (1995) (stating that Qualitex manufactured green-gold pads since 1957); Paul R.
Morico, Protecting Color Per Se in the Wake of Qualitex v. Jacobson, 77 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOCY 571, 572 (1995) ("Since 1957, [Qualitex] has manufactured
and sold press pads by the name of "SUN GLOW" for use on dry cleaning presses.").
Press pads are a kind of "industrial-strength ironing board cover." Jon Van, Manu-
facturer's Bright Outcome; High Court Says Color Counts as Trademark, CHI. TRIB.,
Mar. 29, 1995, at 1. Inspired by his observation of the setting sun filtering through
leaves, the owner of Qualitex Co., Harry Campagna, reproduced the unusual blend
of gold and green color in his press pads almost 30 years ago. Mary Ellen Podmolik,
Court Says Firm Can Trademark Its Color, CHI. SUN TIMES, Mar. 29, 1995, at 53.
' Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1457, 1459 (C.D. Cal.
1991) (finding components of Jacobson pad inferior to those of Qualitex pad), affd in
part, rev'd in part, 13 F.3d 1297 (9th Cir. 1994), rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 1300 (1995). Spe-
cifically, the district court found Jacobson's pads were made of weaker and lighter
materials that resulted in a less durable pad unable to "last for ten months like the
Qualitex pad." Id.
10 Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1302. For the manufacture of its own "Magic Glow" press
pad, Jacobson originally purchased 700 yards of Qualitex green-gold "seconds" ma-
terial which was fabricated by Amerbelle Corporation, the finisher utilized by
Qualitex. Qualitex, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1459. After exhausting the initial supply, Ja-
cobson was "unable to purchase additional Qualitex material ... based upon Amer-
belle's claim that the green-gold color ... was exclusive to Qualitex." Id. Jacobson
then contacted "Unitex," a textile mill, requesting that the company duplicate both
the material and the color of a sample Qualitex swatch. Id. Unitex used an outside
lab to test the composition of the swatch in order to duplicate the Qualitex green-
gold color to Jacobson's satisfaction. Id. On this basis, the district court concluded
"Jacobson intentionally copied the overall look of Qualitex' green-gold press pads."
Id.
,1 Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1302 (citing Registration No. 1,633,711 (Feb. 5, 1991)).
Henry Campagna, owner of Qualitex, recognized the need to protect the special
green-gold color selected for the company's press pads, Van, supra note 8, at 1, be-
cause many dry cleaning establishments are owned and operated by foreign-
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Qualitex then added a trademark infringement claim to a previ-
ously filed lawsuit against Jacobson alleging unfair competi-
tion.12 At the district court level, Qualitex prevailed." The Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's
finding of trademark infringement, holding that the Lanham Act
does not permit the registration of color alone. 4 The Court of
speaking people who have a limited command of the English language. Qualitex, 21
U.S.P.Q.2d at 1458; Van, supra note 8, at 1 (noting that dry cleaning is road of entry
for immigrants and English is typically second language). Under such circum-
stances, a simple English word may fail to convey brand name and quality whereas
a distinctive color is effective. See Van, supra note 8, at 1 (noting that knowledge of
English language is unnecessary to recognize color). Not surprisingly, "[slome pur-
chasers of press pads have come to identify and order Qualitex pads over the tele-
phone by merely describing the [green-gold] color." Qualitex, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1458.
Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1302. Qualitex brought the trademark infringement
claim under § 1114(1) of the Lanham Trademark Act which provides in pertinent
part:
(1) Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant -
(a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imi-
tation of a registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale,
distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on or in connection
with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive; or
(b) reproduce, counterfeit, copy, or colorably imitate a registered mark and
apply such reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation to labels,
signs, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles or advertisements intended
to be used in commerce upon or in connection with the sale, offering for
sale, distribution, or advertising of goods or services on or in connection
with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant for the remedies
hereinafter provided.
15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (1994).
'3 Qualitex, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1462 (finding Qualitex entitled to injunction against
Jacobson's infringement of green-gold registered trademark pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §
1116 (1994)). The district court decided in favor of Qualitex on its claims of both
trademark infringement and unfair competition. Id. at 1462.
'4 Qualitex, 13 F.3d at 1302 (reversing judgment for Qualitex on claim of trade-
mark infringement). The court concluded that the color depletion theory prohibits
the registration of color alone. Id. Specifically, the color depletion theory postulates
that there is a limited supply of usable colors. See Campbell Soup Co. v. Armour &
Co., 175 F.2d 795, 798 (3d Cir. 1949) (articulating color depletion theory and deny-
ing Campbell's request for exclusive use of red because if allowed to "monopolize red
in all of its shades the next manufacturer may monopolize orange ... [o]bviously, the
list of colors will soon, run out."), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 847 (1949); Morico, supra
note 8, at 575 (noting that color depletion theory is premised upon fact that there
are only limited number of colors to designate products in given market); see also
Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1305-06 (stating customer appeal may further limit viable
colors available); First Brands Corp. v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 809 F.2d 1378, 1383 (9th
Cir. 1987) (providing protection to yellow "Prestone" container "would deplete a
primary color available to competitors and deprive them of a competitive need.").
Trademark protection for colors, therefore, will ultimately deplete the colors avail-
1996]
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Appeals, however, affirmed the district court's judgment for
damages and injunctive relief based upon unfair competition, 5
finding that Jacobson Products was liable for infringement of
Qualitex's trade dress. 6 Granting certiorari only on the issue of
color, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Ninth
Circuit and unanimously held that "there is no rule absolutely
barring the use of a color alone" as a trademark.17
In Qualitex, the Court upheld the district court's conclusion
that the green-gold color utilized on the Qualitex dry cleaning
press pads satisfied the requirements for a trademark. 8 In
broadly interpreting the Lanham Act definition of a trademark
able to a manufacturer attempting to enter a market.
In addition to adopting the color depletion theory, the Ninth Circuit expressed
concern over the unnecessary difficulties courts would face if required to distinguish
between similar shades of color. Qualitex, 13 F.3d at 1302; see, e.g., NutraSweet Co.
v. Stadt Corp., 917 F.2d 1024, 1027 (7th Cir. 1990) (questioning range of color pro-
tected by trademark status), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 983 (1991). The court also opined
that "[a]dequate protection is available when color is combined in distinctive pat-
terns or designs or combined in distinctive logos." Qualitex, 13 F.3d at 1302. Finally,
the court concluded that further protection is available under the Lanham Act's
provisions for unfair competition. Id.
"' Qualitex, 13 F.3d at 1305. Qualitex alleged unfair competition under § 43(a) of
the Lanham Act, which holds anyone who uses in commerce any goods which are
likely to cause confusion as to the origin of such goods liable in a civil action. See id.
at 1300-03. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994) (imposing civil liability for use
of false or misleading representation of fact likely to cause confusion).
"6 Qualitex, 13 F.3d at 1305. Consideration of "[tirade dress [infringement] ... re-
quires that all of the [product] features be considered together, not separately."
American Greetings Corp. v. Dan-Dee Importers, Inc., 807 F.2d 1136, 1141 (3d Cir.
1986) (quoting SK & F Co. v. Premo Pharmaceutical Labs., 481 F. Supp. 1184, 1187
(D.N.J. 1979), af/'d, 625 F.2d 1055 (3d Cir. 1980)). Trade dress determines whether
a product has acquired secondary meaning whereby the public is likely to confuse an
imitation with the original. See Qualitex, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1461 (quoting First
Brands, 809 F.2d at 1383); American Greetings, 807 F.2d at 1140-41; see also 15
U.S.C. § 1125 (1994).
17 Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. 1300, 1302 (1995).
18 Id. at 1304 (finding color alone may meet requirements for trademark protec-
tion under some circumstances). For a mark to qualify for trademark protection, a
person must use or intend to use the mark "to identify and distinguish his or her
goods ... from those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the
goods .... " 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994). In addition, the mark must either be inherently
distinctive, see 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)-(f) (1994), or have attained secondary meaning.
See Echo Travel Inc. v. Travel Assocs., Inc., 870 F.2d 1264, 1268 (7th Cir. 1989)
("establishing that a mark has acquired secondary meaning is precisely what re-
moves the mark from the public domain .... "). See generally 2 J. THOMAS
MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 15:1.A, at 657 (2d ed. 1984).
Professor McCarthy notes that secondary meaning is the "mental association in
buyers' minds between the alleged mark and a single source of the product." Id. §
15:2.A, at 659.
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as "any word, name, symbol, or device," 9 the Court found that
color alone was not precluded from serving as a trademark.Y0
The Court applied a two-part test to determine when color alone
may qualify for trademark protection.2 This test first considers
whether the color has a "secondary meaning"2 2 and secondly de-
termines if the color is "functional."23 In concluding that the
"secondary meaning" prong was met, the Court determined that
some customers associated the unusual green-gold color with
Qualitex press pads.24 The second prong, or "functionality" doc-
15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994).
20 Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1302. The Court stated that "[tihe language of the Lan-
ham Act describes th[e] universe [of things that can qualify as trademarks] in the
broadest of terms." Id. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994) (defining words used in
trademark statutes).
21 Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1302-05; see Mana Prod., Inc. v. Columbia Cosmetics
Mfg., Inc., 65 F.3d 1063 (2d Cir. 1995) (applying secondary meaning/fimctionality
test articulated in Qualitex to hold color that black used in makeup compacts did
not pass test). See generally Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d
1210, 1215-18 (8th Cir. 1976) (providing considerations for hindering competition).
If the particular feature is an important ingredient in the commercial suc-
cess of the product, the interest in free competition permits its imitation in
the absence of a patent or copyright. On the other hand, where the feature
or, more aptly, design, is a mere arbitrary embellishment, a form of dress
for the goods primarily adopted for purposes of identification and indi-
viduality and, hence, unrelated to basic consumer demands in connection
with the product, imitation may be forbidden where the requisite showing
of secondary meaning is made. Under such circumstances since effective
competition may be undertaken without imitation, the law grants protec-
tion.
Id. at 1217-18 (citations omitted).
"Secondary meaning" is not defined by statute. The Supreme Court has ex-
plained that secondary meaning may be defined as the process through which cus-
tomers, over time, "come to treat a particular color on a product or its packaging ...
as signiIring a brand." Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1303.
"Functionality" is controlled by a product's useful features and whether protec-
tion of those features would inhibit legitimate competition. Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at
1304. A handle on a cup, for example, serves the functional purpose of providing a
secure hold and is therefore precluded from trademark protection. Id. The Supreme
Court noted that innovation is given limited protection by patents, whereas trade-
marks are not intended to provide a perpetual monopoly. Id. If a product feature "is
essential to the use or purpose of the article or if it affects the cost or quality of the
article" and would place competitors at a significant disadvantage, the feature is
functional and cannot be trademarked. Id. (quoting Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs.
Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 850 n.10 (1982)).
24 Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1304-05. The Court found that a product's color could
come to identify the source of the product just as a descriptive name could. Id. at
1303. Qualitex proved secondary meaning to the district court's satisfaction by es-
tablishing a number of facts. Qualitex, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1458. These facts included
the exclusive use of the green-gold color in Qualitex's advertising, flyers and display
1996]
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trine, prevents the trademarking and thereby monopolization of
a useful product feature. The Court determined that a product's
color may be trademarked if it is not essential to the product's
purpose or does not affect its price or quality." The Court ac-
cepted the district court's findings and concluded that the green-
gold color of Qualitex pads was not functional." Finally, the
Court rejected Jacobson's four arguments for a special legal rule
preventing manufacturers from appropriating a particular color
for their products.27 Jacobson argued that providing trademark
protection to color alone would create problems of shade confu-
sion," restrict competition through color depletion,29 upset exist-
booths at trade shows; the expenditure of approximately $1,621,000 for advertising
and promotion of the green-gold color; and the results of a survey in which 39% of
respondents identified the Jacobson look-alike pad as a Qualitex product. Id. "It is
[important] to note, however, that the [Supreme] Court did not assume that color
could function as a trademark without secondary meaning." Douglass, supra note 8,
at 7; see Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1303. Therefore, the significant issue of whether a
color may be inherently distinctive and not require a showing of secondary meaning
prior to trademark registration remains open. See Pet'r Oral Argument, 1995 WL
61097 at *12-13, Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. 1300 (stating petitioners are not asking Court
to reach issue of whether color is inherently distinctive).
25 Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. 1300, 1304 (1995). If functional features could be trade-
marked, an inventor could perpetually prevent competitors from using the feature
in their own products, and thereby hinder effective competition. See Morton-
Norwich, 671 F.2d at 1339-40 (holding that precluding competitors from imitating
functional designs or features would deny them opportunity to compete effectively).
In applying this doctrine to color, courts have found colors to be functional in vari-
ous circumstances. See Brunswick, 35 F.3d at 1532-34 (affirming Patent Office's
finding that registration of black color mark on outboard engines would hinder com-
petition because color black complements variety of boat colors and makes engines
appear smaller); Deere & Co. v. Farmhand, Inc., 560 F. Supp. 85, 98 (S.D. Iowa
1982) (finding that color green functional when used on farm machinery because
studies showed farmers prefer their equipment to match), affd, 721 F.2d 253 (8th
Cir. 1983).
26 Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1305 (stating there is no competitive need for green-gold
color and since color serves no other function, color alone could be used as trade-
mark).
27 Id. at 1305-08.
Id. at 1305; see also Qualitex, 13 F.3d at 1302 ("Drawing distinctions between
close shades of color could present unnecessary problems."); NutraSweet, 917 F.2d
at 1027 (posturing that only method to resolve questions posed by shade confusion
would be litigation); Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1131 (Bissell, J., dissenting)
(extending Lanham Act protection to color will result in shade confusion).
29 Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1305-06. For a discussion of color depletion theory, see
supra note 14 (discussing color depletion theory). See also NutraSweet, 917 F.2d at
1028 (allowing tabletop sweeteners to appropriate particular colors for their prod-
ucts would deter newcomers from entering market); Campbell Soup Co. v. Armour
& Co., 175 F.2d 795, 798 (3rd Cir. 1949) (holding that permitting soup company to
monopolize color red may cause list of available colors to run out). But see Master
[Vol. 70:337
QUALITEX CO.
ing precedent," and be unnecessary since trade dress provides
protection for color alone.31 None of these arguments, however,
persuaded the Court.32
It is submitted that the Qualitex Court erred in extending
Lanham Act protection to the green-gold color of Qualitex press
pads because providing trademark protection to color alone will
bar new entrants to some markets." The potential inability to
distinguish between various shades of color will require industry
newcomers to avoid a wide range of hues similar to currently
trademarked colors.34 Removal of wide bands of colors from
Distribs., Inc. v. Pako Corp., 986 F.2d 219, 224 (8th Cir. 1993) (declining to establish
per se prohibition against protecting color alone as trademark because it would cre-
ate confusion and inconsistency); Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1128 (allowing trade-
mark registration of color pink for fiberglass insulation).
3' Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1307. The Court rejected existing precedent relied on by
Jacobson because much of the case law predated the enactment of the Lanham Act
in 1946. Id.; see Coca-Cola Co. v. Koke Co. of America, 254 U.S. 143, 147 (1920)
("coloring matter is free to all who make it"); A. Leschen & Sons Rope Co. v. Broder-
ick & Bascom Rope Co., 201 U.S. 166, 171 (1906) (questioning validity of color as
protectable trademark). Since the Act embodied crucial changes which liberalized
trademark law to permit at times the protection of color, the Court held that these
decisions were no longer relevant. Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1307. Moreover, Congress
amended the Lanham Act in 1988 but left the words "word, name, symbol, or device"
undisturbed, after those terms had already been interpreted to include color in some
jurisdictions. Id.
3' Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1308 (1995). The Court disagreed with this argument and
held that trademark law afforded protection in a manner that trade dress protection
could not. Id. For example, under trademark law, the holder of a mark can prevent
the importation of confusingly similar goods, 15 U.S.C. § 1124 (1994), and has prima
facie evidence of validity and ownership. 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b) (1994).
32 Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1308.
See, e.g., NutraSweet, 917 F.2d at 1028 (barring tabletop sweetener manufac-
turer from registering color of product packaging since it would deter new entrants);
Spraying Sys. Co. v. Delavan, Inc., 762 F. Supp. 772, 780 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (noting
that grant of permission to register colors to all present competitors would deter
new entrants), affd, 975 F.2d 387 (7th Cir. 1992); see also Mitek Corp. v. Pyramid
Sound Corp., No. 91 C20152, 1991 WL 292621, at *4 (N.D. IM. July 9, 1991) ("The
essential purpose of trademark law is to prevent confusion, not to bar new entrants
into the market.").
34 See infra notes 40-62 and accompanying text (discussing confusion specific to
distinguishing color); see also Campbell Soup, 175 F.2d at 798 (asserting that manu-
facturers will monopolize colors in all of their shades until available colors would be
depleted if trademark of color is allowed); Master Distribs., Inc. v. Pako Corp., 777
F. Supp. 744, 745 (D. Minn. 1991) (noting both customers and distributors often or-
der plaintiffs splicing tape by asking for 'the blue tape' or simply for 'blue'), rev'd,
986 F.2d 219 (8th Cir. 1993). But see Michael B. Landau, Trademark Protection for
Color Per Se After Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co.: Another Grey Area in the
Law, 2 U.C.LA. ENT. L. REV. 1, 21 (1995) (asserting that shade confusion doctrine
was judicially created and not grounded in empirical studies).
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those available for commercial use may deplete the supply of col-
ors available and thereby make it difficult for market newcomers
to compete effectively.35 It is further submitted that the Su-
preme Court failed to consider adequately the unique problems
presented by color when it held that trademark protection ex-
tends to color alone. This interpretation of the Lanham Act will
increase litigation as manufacturers and courts attempt to de-
lineate which shades are still lawfully available to competitors.
Absent a reasonable and easily comprehendible standard for the
breadth of color protection, the Qualitex decision will ultimately
result in the virtual closing of some markets to new entrants.
This Comment suggests that both shade confusion problems
and the color depletion theory provide persuasive arguments
against extending trademark protection to color. Further, this
Comment asserts that the implementation of the functionality
doctrine effectively bars the use of trademarks consisting of color
alone in most markets. Finally, even if in some rare instances
the Lanham Act does protect color alone, it is submitted that the
Court erred in its application of trademark law to the particular
See infra notes 64-85 and accompanying text (explaining limitations of available
colors in many markets). Manufacturers in certain industries already face severe
practical limitations on the range of potential colors that can be used on their prod-
ucts. See, e.g., Laureyssens v. Idea Group, Inc., 768 F. Supp. 1036, 1047 (S.D.N.Y.
1991) (recognizing that certain color combinations are particularly appealing in
children's product market and only certain dyes may be used to produce these colors
under government toxicity standards), affd in part, rev'd in part, injunction va-
cated, 964 F.2d 131 (1992); Elizabeth A. Overcamp, The Qualitex Monster: The Color
Trademark Disaster, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 595, n.187 (1995) (quoting Ronald Alsop,
Color Grows More Important in Catching Consumers' Eyes, WALL ST. J., Nov. 29,
1984, at D1 (asserting it is "unwise to sell whole milk in anything but a red carton"
and because McDonald's customers believe restaurants only sell fast food if their
sign contains red and yellow)). In addition to limitations created by consumer
stereotyping, manufacturers choose the color of their products to increase sales and
product desirability. See Randall Lane, Does Orange Mean Cheap? (Effect of Color
on Sales of Commercial Products), FORBES, Dec. 23, 1991, at 144 (noting that Igloo
Products Corp's 15% increase in sales of coolers since turquoise and raspberry prod-
ucts added to line); Anastasia Toufexis, The Bluing of America, TIME, July 18, 1983,
at 62 (discussing manufacturers' use of color psychology to manipulate consumer
tastes including use of white backgrounds accompanied by splashes of primary col-
ors on detergent boxes to symbolize cleanliness, coloring appliances in subdued or
bright hues depending upon gender of target audience, and use of white back-
grounds on diet products and low-tar cigarettes to convey feeling of purity); Warm
Glow of Colgate Explained, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1995, at D3 (stating color psy-
chologists believe close link exists between product's color and consumer buying
preferences). Some psychologists specifically linking popularity of Marlboro, Col-
gate, Coca-Cola, and Campbell's soup to their red colored packages. Id.
[Vol. 70:337
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facts of the Qualitex case.
I. SHOULD THE LAW EXTEND TRADEMARK PROTECTION TO COLOR
ALONE?
The Lanham Act gives a seller or manufacturer of a product
the exclusive right to register and use a trademark." The Act
aims to prevent unfair competition, to protect sellers' reputa-
tions, and to preserve consumer expectations of quality.37 Al-
though the language of the Act places few restrictions on what
may be registered,38 courts have imposed limits on what is elig-
"s 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (1994) (allowing trademark registration for mark which distin-
guishes "goods of the applicant" from goods of others); see also Prestonettes, Inc. v.
Coty, 264 U.S. 359, 360 (1924) (asserting twin purposes served by securing trade-
mark are to identify product of particular trader and protect trader's good will
against unfair competition); Stephen J. Newman, Comment, Kill the "Mere Color"
Rule: Equal Protection for Color Under the Lanham Act, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1595,
1598 (1994) (stating Lanham Act aims to prohibit one manufacturer from "taking
advantage of the good name of another"); Peter W. Smith, Note, Trademarks, Par-
ody, and Consumer Confusion: A Workable Lanham Act Infringement Standard, 12
CARDOZO L. REV. 1525, 1529 (1991) ("One of the principal goals of the Lanham Act is
toprotect consumers from confusion and deception in the marketplace.").
See Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 768 (noting that Lanham Act was enacted to prevent
deceptive use of marks and protect persons engaged in commerce against unfair
competition); Inwood Labs., 456 U.S. at 854 n.14 (stating Lanham Act aims to pro-
tect owner's goodwill in marketplace and consumers' ability to distinguish among
goods of competing manufacturers).
The Lanham Act was necessitated by the lack of existing federal regulation of
trademarks which, prior to 1946, was governed solely by state and federal common
law. S. REP. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1274, 1276-77. The abolition of federal common law by the Supreme Court enabled
individual states to change their common law with respect to trademarks and al-
lowed trademark rights in one state to differ from the rights enjoyed in another. Id.
Additionally, the increasing number of commercial international conventions en-
tered into by the United States required implementation of legislation designed to
fully secure the rights of foreign nationals to trademark protection in the United
States. Id. at 1276. The Senate Committee on Patents succinctly summarized the
inequities that this legislation purported to remedy:
The purpose of this bill is to place all matters relating to trade-marks in
one statute and to eliminate judicial obscurity, to simplify registration and
to make it stronger and more liberal, to dispense with mere technical pro-
hibitions and arbitrary provisions, to make procedure simple, and relief
against infringement prompt and effective.
Id. at 1274.
s Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1302. The language of the Lanham Act describes the
"universe of things" which may qualify as a trademark in the "broadest of terms,"
id., including "any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof." 15
U.S.C. § 1127 (1994). "Since human beings might use as a 'symbol' or 'device' almost
anything at all that is capable of carrying meaning, this language, read literally, is
not restrictive." Qualitex, 115 U.S. at 1302-03; see Newman, supra note 36, at 1598
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ible for protection.39 In light of the problems associated with
shade confusion and the risk of color depletion, it appears that
trademark protection should not have been extended to color
alone.
A. Shade Confusion
A law that allows the trademarking of color alone will pro-
duce uncertainty among competitors and the judiciary, resulting
in unnecessary litigation over which shades of color are lawfully
available for use.4" In failing to recognize the unique challenges
of shade perception,41 the Supreme Court determined that the
(stating that "[Lanham Act] does not expressly require that trademarks be verbal or
even visual"). Courts have used this sweeping language to extend trademark pro-
tection to decorative aspects of cheerleaders' uniforms, Dallas Cowboy Cheerleaders,
Inc., v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 204-06 (2d Cir. 1979), as well as to
scented yarns and threads, In re Clark, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1238, 1239
(Trademark Trial & Appeal Bd. 1990). See also In re General Elec. Broadcasting Co.,
199 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 560, 563 (Trademark Trial & Appeal Bd. 1978) (recognizing
sound may serve as trademark despite denying registration of bell sound at issue).
39 The two primary requirements for what may be trademarked are distinctive-
ness and nonfunctionality. See Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537
F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976) (describing system of classification to determine distinctive-
ness of trademark); Deere, 560 F. Supp. at 89 (denying trademark protection to
functional color green). See generally 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 18, at § 7:26-28
(discussing policy reasons supporting requirement of nonfunctionality as prerequi-
site to trademark and providing examples of features held functional and nonfunc-
tional). Courts often base the amount of protection given to a registered trademark
on its distinctiveness. See Abercrombie & Fitch, 537 F.2d at 9. The classes of terms
relating to distinctiveness are: (1) generic; (2) descriptive; (3) suggestive; and (4)
arbitrary or fanciful. Id Fanciful marks (words expressly coined to function as
trademarks), arbitrary marks (common words or symbols that are arbitrarily ap-
plied to the goods or services in question in a non-descriptive or suggestive manner),
and suggestive marks (words and symbols not directly descriptive but which need
no secondary meaning for protection) are all classified as inherently distinctive
marks. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 18, §§ 11:1-2, at 433-36. The use of an inherently
distinctive mark creates a presumption that the mark becomes synonymous with
the source of the goods, obviating the necessity of establishing consumer recognition
to secure legal protection. Id. at 435; see also Coach Leatherware Co., Inc. v. Ann
Taylor, Inc., 933 F.2d 162, 170 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that "inherently distinctive
shape and composition of Coach hang tag" eliminated necessity of proving consumer
recognition).
In Qualitex, the Court only considered whether the green-gold color qualified as
a descriptive mark. Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1303-04. A descriptive mark may gain
trademark protection only upon a finding of "secondary meaning," that is, if pur-
chasers have come to associate the mark with a particular source or manufacturer
and to distinguish between goods possessing the mark and those that do not. Aber-
crombie & Fitch, 537 F.2d at 10; 1 McCARTHY, supra note 18, at 454.
'0 See supra note 28 and accompanying text (discussing shade confusion).
41 Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1305 ("We do not believe, however, that color ... is spe-
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same legal standards that guide courts in distinguishing be-
tween similar sounding words and phrases would also be used in
comparing colors.42 In addition, the Court neglected to provide
lower courts with sufficient guidelines with which to determine
cial.).
Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1305. But see supra notes 41-58 and accompanying text
(discussing how perception of color differs from that of words). The standard legal
test for comparing words is whether the two marks and their respective products
are so similar "as to be likely to cause confusion among reasonably careful purchas-
ers." Upjohn Co. v. Schwartz, 246 F.2d 254, 262 (2d Cir. 1957); see Albert Dickinson
Co. v. Mellos Peanut Co., 179 F.2d 265, 269-70 (7th Cir. 1950) (finding that trial
court should determine likelihood of consumer confusion based upon testimony of
ordinary product purchasers and evidence of manner in which both products sold
and not on basis of side by side visual comparison of similar product names). There
is, however, no requirement of a showing of actual confusion. Kimberly-Clark Corp.
v. H. Douglas Enters., 774 F.2d 1144, 1147 (Fed. Cir. 1985); see MGM-Pathe Com-
munications Co. v. Pink Panther Patrol, 774 F. Supp. 869, 876 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) ("[If
the law required proof of actual confusion before likelihood could be found, trade-
mark owners would be required to incur actual irreparable harm before they could
obtain protection for their marks."). Purchasers of relatively inexpensive and fre-
quently replaceable products are "held to a lesser standard of purchasing care."
Kimberly-Clark Corp., 774 F.2d at 1146 (quoting In re Martin's Famous Pastry
Shoppe, Inc., 748 F.2d 1565, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1984)). A strong, non-descriptive mark
is given the highest degree of protection especially when exploited on a national ba-
sis. G. D. Searle & Co. v. Institutional Drug Distribs., 151 F. Supp. 715, 717 (S.D.
Cal. 1957); cf. Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation's Foodservice, Inc., 710 F.2d 1565, 1569
(Fed. Cir. 1983) (noting that one factor reviewed in determining likelihood of confu-
sion is "fame of the prior mark, as measured by volume of sales, advertising, and
length of use"). See generally Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492,
495 (2d Cir.) (providing non-inclusive list of factors to determine likelihood of con-
fusion when products are different, including: "strength of [the] mark"; "degree of
similarity between the two marks"; "proximity of the products"; _ikelihood that the
prior owner will bridge the gap"; "actual confusion"; "reciprocal of defendant's good
faith in adopting its own mark"; "quality of defendant's products"; and
"sophistication of the buyers"), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 820 (1961); In re E.I. DuPont
DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (listing factors that must be
considered when evaluating likelihood of confusion to include "similarity or dissimi-
larity of the marks in their entireties as to appearance, sound, connotation and
commercial impressionS; "similarity or dissimilarity and nature of the goods or
services"; "similarity or dissimilarity of established, likely-to-continue trade chan-
nels"; "conditions under which and buyers to whom sales are made"; "fame of the
prior mark (sales, advertising, length of use)"; "nature and extent of any actual con-
fusion"; and "extent of potential confusion").
In evaluating alleged trademark infringement, it has been noted that "[silight
differences in the sound of similar trademarks will not protect the infringer." G.D.
Searle & Co. v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 265 F.2d 385, 387 (7th Cir.) (citing Lambert
Pharmacal Co. v. Bolton Chem. Corp., 219 F. 325, 326 (2d Cir. 1915), cert. denied,
361 U.S. 819 (1959)); see, e.g., Kimberly-Clark Corp., 774 F.2d at 1146-47 (finding
word "DOUGIES" infringed upon "HUGGIES" trademark when both products were
disposable diapers sold to identical class of consumers in same type of retail out-
lets).
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the range of shades protected under a color trademark.43
Courts are accustomed to dealing with words." Two words,
in simple visual appearance, are either identical or they are not.
"HUGGIES," for example, is simply not the same word as
"DOUGIES," despite the similarity in sound.45 The perception of
color, however, is entirely different from the visualization of
words.46 The appearance of color may change profoundly depend-
See Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1305 (stating that application of current legal stan-
dards should be sufficient for color comparisons). The Court suggested that lower
courts replicate the "lighting conditions under which a colored product is normally
sold" in comparing similar colors. Id. The fact that purchasers ordered the press
pads by telephone, however, demonstrates the unfeasibility of the Court's sugges-
tion. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods., 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1457, 1458 (C.D. Cal.
1991), affd in part, rev'd in part, 13 F.3d 1297 (9th Cir. 1994), rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 1300
(1995). An equally impracticable situation for determining "normal lighting condi-
tions" is identifiable in the case of traveling salepersons, who display their wares in
a wide variety of lighting situations. See Amsted Indus. Inc. v. West Coast Wire
Rope & Rigging Inc., 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1755, 1758-60 (Trademark Trial & Appeal
Bd. 1987) (declining to compare photographic specimen of applicant's product with
prior trademark owner's and noting that, even if Board so desired, poor quality of
photographic evidence rendered determination of actual shade impossible). But see
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Armco Steel Corp., 170 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 162, 163
n.2 (Trademark Trial & Appeal Bd. 1971) (recognizing that Board possessed sample
of registrant's color-coded pipe, sample, and photographs of applicant's similarly-
colored fence posts); In re Hodes-Lange Corp., 167 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 255, 256
(Trademark Trial & Appeal Bd. 1970) (comparing ampules manufactured by appli-
cant with ones manufactured by trademark registrant to determine likelihood of
consumer confusion).
4Newman, supra note 36, at 1595 (finding that when faced with symbols other
than words, courts "frequently forget everything they know").
45 See Kimberly-Clark, 774 F.2d at 1146 ("HUGGIES and DOUGIES sound much
alike and actually rhyme, especially if... the latter is pronounced as if derived from
the name 'Doug.'").
4' GEORGE A. AGOSTON, COLOR THEORY AND ITS APPLICATION IN ART AND DESIGN
7 (Dr. Jay M. Enoch et al., eds., 1979) (explaining that color is sensation produced in
brain in response to light received by eye's retina); ANNI BERGER-SCHUNN,
PRACTICAL COLOR MEASUREMENT 1-2 (Joseph W. Goodman ed. & Max Saltzman
trans., 1994) ("It is certain that the eye has receptors for light, which transform the
light falling on it into stimuli, which are sent by nerves to the brain, where the color
perception originates."). The process of color perception is complicated. DEANE B.
JUDD & GUNTER WYSZECKI, COLOR IN BUSINESS, SCIENCE, AND INDUSTRY 27
(Stanley S. Ballard ed., 3d ed. 1975). While the visible radiation is capable of objec-
tive measurement, however, the imprint on the mind is entirely subjective. See
JUDD & WYSZECKI, supra, at 28; Color Measurement: Colorimeters and Spectropho-
tometers, INSTRUMENT Bus. OUTLOOK, Nov. 1, 1992, at *1 available in Westlaw,
1992 WL 2215823 [hereinafter Colorimeters and Spectrophotometers] (noting that
factors such as age, fatigue, and mood affect each individual's subjective color per-
ception); Color Measurement Technology Extends Application Spectrum, IN-
STRUMENT Bus. OUTLOOK, Dec. 31, 1994, at *1 available in Westlaw, 1994 WL
2644831 [hereinafter Color Measurement Technology] (asserting that color percep-
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ing upon the environment in which it is viewed."'
The first variable in color perception is light." A color may
appear to alter several shades depending on whether it is viewed
in natural, florescent, dim or bright lighting."9 Secondly, a color's
tion can differ from person to person and consistency of individual's perception is
subject to both external and internal forces, such as mood swings). All color control
in industry is focused on the subjective color perception of the customer. See JUDD &
WYSZECKI, supra, at 28; Tim Triplett, More to Color Testing Than Meets the Eye,
INDUS. PAINT & POWDER, Feb. 1, 1995, at 20, *4 available in Westlaw, 1995 WEL
8465120 (stating that industries use "standard observer" based upon study of retinal
responses to varying color to determine consumer's perception of product color).
4 In order to perceive color precisely, it must be viewed under prescribed condi-
tions, that is, under only one light source and for one observer. AGOSTON, supra note
46, at 9; see also BERGER-SCHUNN, supra note 46, at 2.
In order to appreciate the complexity of color perception and the impact of ex-
ternal and intrinsic conditions, it is necessary to understand some fundamental
principles of color. The distinct appearance of a color is the result of differences be-
tween the three main attributes of color: hue, value and chroma. Triplett, supra
note 46, at *2. "[Hlue is the basic color, such as red, green, yellow or blue." Id.; see
JUDD & WYSZECKI, supra note 46, at 376 (defining hue as "[a]ttribute of visual sen-
sation which has given rise to color names"); ANTAL NEMCSICS, COLOUR DYNAMICS
1, 29 (D.H. Sharp Trans., 1993) (defining hue as "attributable to colours that per-
mits them to be described as ... blue, green, yellow, red or purple"). Value describes
"the color's intensity or degree of lightness." Triplett, supra note 46, at *2; see also
NEMcsIcs, supra, at 29 (using term "lightness" to describe attribute of colors by
which "object appears to reflect or transmit ... light"). "Chroma describes the color's
vividness or dullness." Triplett, supra note 46, at *2; see also JUDD & WYSZECKI, su-
pra note 46, at 376 (describing chroma as "[a]ttribute of a visual sensation which
permits a judgment to be made of the amounts of pure chromatic color present, irre-
spective of the amount of achromatic color.") These three attributes are affected by
changes in ambient lighting, viewing angle, and surrounding objects. See NEMcsIcS,
supra note 47, at 76-81 (providing results and analysis of experiments conducted
with variances of ambient conditions); Dan R. Schinasi, Multiangle Color Testing,
INDUS. PAINT & POWDER, Feb. 1, 1993, at 14, available in Westlaw, 1993 WL
3179021, at *2-3 (asserting that all three color attributes vary depending upon
viewing angle).
48 See, e.g., BERGER-SCHUNN, supra note 46, at 1 (explaining that light is neces-
sary to view colors). As light diminishes and dark increases, colors fade to shades of
grey. Id.
'9 JUDD & WYSZECKI, supra note 46, at 33 (stating that replacing incandescent
lamp with florescent lamp changed visual stimuli so greatly that colors were no
longer perceived to be same); see BERGER-SCHUNN, supra note 46, at 3-13
(explaining that source of incident light has large influence on perceived color). A
viewer may perceive an exact color match under a certain light source, and very lit-
tle similarity under a different illuminant. RALPH M. EVANS, AN INTRODUCTION To
COLOR 223 (1948). For example, two shades of yellow may be noticeably different in
daylight, but indistinguishable in artificial light. Id.
Colors that appear identical under one type of light, but very different under
another, are called metameric pairs. Triplett, supra note 46, at *6-7. Business or-
ganizations attempting to project a uniform corporate identity have discovered that
the location and illumination of their logos occasionally resulted in a radically dif-
ferent appearance. Colorimeters and Spectrophotometers, supra note 46, at *1. The
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appearance can change dramatically when juxtaposed with an-
other color.5" For example, a green item placed on a red shelf
appears to be a different shade than the same green item placed
on a grey shelf.5 Third, and most important, the perception of
color is essentially subjective." Color exists only in the mind of
impact of ambient light upon color perception is especially problematic when the
product possesses a metallic or pearlescent finish. See Triplett, supra note 46, at *7
(discussing "flop" which are changes in appearance of color of metallic finishes un-
der different ambient light conditions and viewing angles); see also Schinasi, supra
note 47, at *2 (noting test methods utilized by manufacturers to prevent "flop"
problems); JUDD & WYSZECKI, supra note 46, at 411-38 (analyzing impact of color
surface on perception). In order to ensure that customers are presented with a con-
sistent product, manufacturers have spent approximately $115 million on colorime-
ters and color spectrophotometers to remedy the difficulties in color matching
products manufactured in different locales under varying conditions. Colorimeters
and Spectrophotometers, supra note 46, at *1.
A customer depends on a mental standard of color. JUDD & WYSZECKI, supra
note 46, at 33. This standard is subject to uncertainty based upon the light source.
Id. Generally, the visual mechanism of the viewer will almost always act to see re-
lated colors on a single object; that is, it will perceive the object in relation to the
amount of illumination. Id. at 24-25. For example, a viewer will perceive a cube that
is pale green on the top with darker shades of green on its sides to be illuminated
from above. Id. at 25.
50 BERGER-SCHUNN, supra note 46, at 2 (explaining that color perception depends
on color background of sample); NEMCSICS, supra note 47, at 130 ("Colour values
change character when adjacent.") (quoting JOHANN W. GOETHE, THEORY OF
COLOURS 281 (Charles L. Eastlake, trans., 1810)). This phenomenon is called simul-
taneous color contrast. AGOSTON, supra note 46, at 5; NEMCSICS, supra note 47, at
130 (quoting GOETHE, supra). Since sensation is influenced by the contrast between
two adjacent colors, the impact of a color may be enhanced or diminished by con-
trasting. NEMSCICS, supra note 47, at 124-31.
Another visual effect, the "spreading effect," also depends in part on the color of
adjacent areas. EVANS, supra note 49, at 181. These shifts in brightness, however,
are opposite to those that would be predicted on the basis of simultaneous contrast
effects. Id. For example, a blue area surrounded by black will appear darker and
more intensely saturated than a blue area surrounded by white, and different in hue
from a blue area surrounded by red. See id. at 192A ("Plate XI") (providing illustra-
tive example demonstrating spreading effect). Until this "spreading effect" can be
explained without elaborate assumptions, science cannot truly state that it under-
stands the visual process. Id. at 181.
5' AGOSTON, supra note 46, at 5. "This visual phenomenon is called simultaneous
color contrast." Id.
52 Colorimeters and Spectrophotometers, supra note 46, at *1; see also BERGER-
SCHUNN, supra note 46, at 2 ("Color perception is different for all people with nor-
mal vision ... ."). Although perception variations are not normally conspicuous, ob-
servers with normal vision regularly judge color variations differently when
matching pairs of color samples. Id.
Approximately 96% of the population have vision in the normal range, while the
remaining 4% have abnormal color vision. Id. at 2, 19-26. Normal eyes, however, are
colorblind if they view an object indirectly, under insufficient light, or for an insuf-
ficient period of time. JUDD & WYSZECKI, supra note 46, at 77-78; see EVANS, supra
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the observer. 3 Two colors composed of substantially different
light waves when measured with a spectrophotometer can ap-
pear virtually identical to a human observer." Furthermore,
one's perception of color can vary depending upon the individual
observer's age and memory, as well as the surface attributes of
the color itself.55 It will be extremely difficult for industry new-
note 49, at 185 ("Viewing of a color in a particular situation is, at best, a peculiar
mixture of attention, intention and memory."). Depending upon the individual, one
of these attributes will dominate the color perception with results that are com-
pletely unpredictable. EVANS, supra note 49, at 185; see also Eric Sfiligoj, Clearly
Uncerned? [sic], BEVERAGE WORLD, Apr. 1, 1993, at 57, at *5 available in Westlaw,
1993 WL 3038314 (analyzing trend in beverage market toward clear drinks and
quoting executive of beverage company stating, [lelven if you could come up with a
cola that tastes like cola without the color, the visual perception might be hard to
overcome'" since caramel coloring is such an ingrained part of the consumer's im-
age).
" Newman, supra note 36, at 1609. Psychological measurement is basically more
important than computerized measurement for all aspects of color. HANS ARENS,
COLOR MEASUREMENT 62 (KH. Ruddock, trans., 1967). The human mind interprets
colored images based upon the stimulation of cones, which are receptors in the eye.
See BERGER-SCHUNN, supra note 46, at 20 (stating cones are responsible for color
vision); JUDD & WYSZECKI, supra note 46, at 8 (explaining process by which changes
in optic image are transmitted to brain). Normal humans have three types of cones
with which to interpret visual stimuli, each with two receptors. BERGER-SCHUNN,
supra note 46, at 23-24. People with color-defective vision may have a receptor that
is significantly less sensitive than persons with normal vision. Id. Because people
with such a problem may learn to compensate adequately for daily life, testing with
color plates or an instrument may be necessary to determine defective color vision.
Id.
' Newman, supra note 36, at 1609 (noting that perception of color depends upon
"amount of stimulation received by receptors in the eye"); see also ROBERT M.
BOYNTON, HUMAN COLOR VISION 45-50 (1979) (asserting that not every electromag-
netic radiation corresponds to given color). Computerized color instruments may, in
some cases, produce results that correspond to a viewer's perceived sensation of
color. ARENS, supra note 53, at 61. In other cases, however, such measurement pro-
vides no indication of the viewer's actual sensation. Id.; see BERGER-SCHUNN, supra
note 46, at vii (explaining disadvantages of computerized color analysis). The identi-
cal color sensation can be elicited in viewers by color stimuli which are substantially
different when spectrally measured. See AGOSTON, supra note 46, at 36 (explaining
colors do not have to be same wavelength to be perceived as identical); NEMCSICS,
supra note 47, at 31 (discussing metamerism-phenomenon by which two or more
surface colors appear identical under differing light sources); see also JUDD &
WYSZECKI, supra note 46, at 45-46 (explaining theory that perception of object color
under given stimulus is identical to perception of object color under stimuli of same
hue, value, and chroma regardless of spectral composition).
As people age, their lenses develop a yellowish or brownish pigment which de-
creases sensitivity to violet and blue light, thereby changing color perception.
BERGER-SCHUNN, supra note 46, at 19; see also JUDD & WYSZECKI, supra note 46, at
13 (stating that aging causes development of yellowish or brownish pigment in
lenses). Changes in the crystallinity of the lens may also contribute to variation in
color perception between young and old viewers. BERGER-SCHUNN, supra note 46, at
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comers and courts to accurately determine whether a majority of
viewers would find two shades confusingly similar because the
perception of color depends upon lighting, adjacent colors, and
the individual viewer."5 Consequently, market newcomers must
avoid a range of similar shades in selecting a color for commer-
cial use to avoid infringing upon a color trademark.57
Moreover, courts assessing the registrability of trademarks
consisting of color alone are likely to confront a lack of evidence
when applying the Qualitex decision. Trademark registrations
are printed only in black and white. 8 Where color is a feature of
the trademark, the color may be indicated only by using one of
eight code linings.59 Courts may have only the black and white
drawing and the verbal description of the color in the application
with which to evaluate the claim and assess the likelihood of
61-62. Additionally, memory plays a role in the perception of color. "The color most
frequently seen on surrounding objects is indelible from our memory, and its after-
image becomes a permanent characteristic. The so-called real colour of a given ob-
ject is, in fact, the colour associated to this object in our memory." NEMCSICS, supra
note 47, at 124. Moreover, eyes that have looked upon a colored surface for a few
minutes may undergo a "retuning," at which time the perceived color changes. Id. at
121. For example, after retuning orange seems more yellow and violet appears more
blue. Id. "Retuning" strains the eyes, and may lead to temporarily reduced color vi-
sion. Id. at 122. Finally, one's perception of a color is strongly influenced by the ac-
companying surface attribute such as glittering, transparent, glossy, matte, etc.
ARENS, supra note 53, at 14; see supra note 49 (discussing "flop" and associated sur-
face reflection phenomenon). The average viewer is quite incapable of comparing
two colors with markedly different surface attributes. EVANS, supra note 49, at 184-
85 (giving example of comparing satin with cotton). In order to accurately perceive a
color, therefore, it must be completely isolated. ARENS, supra note 53, at 15.
56 See BERGER-SCHUNN, supra note 46, at 2 (stating that color perception is differ-
ent for all people with normal vision); EvANs, supra note 49, at 185 (explaining that
perception of color varies from individual to individual). "Our perception and the
measured values say that both samples, if at all, match under only one light source
and for one observer." BERGER-SCHUNN, supra note 46, at 2; see also supra note 52
(explaining how color perception differs for all people with normal vision).
5' See G.D. Searle & Co. v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 265 F.2d 385, 387 (7th Cir.) ("One
entering a field of endeavor already occupied by another should, in the selection of a
trade-name or trade-mark, keep far enough away to avoid all possible confusion.")
(quoting Northam Warren Corp. v. Universal Cosmetic Co., 18 F.2d 774, 775 (7th
Cir. 1927), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 819 (1959)).
5 37 C.F.R. § 2.53(a), (b) (1995).
'9 37 C.F.R. § 2.52(e) (1995). The eight code linings are: Red or Pink, Brown, Blue,
Gray or Silver, Violet or Purple, Green, Orange, and Yellow or Gold. Id.; see also In
re Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 774 F.2d 1116, 1131 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (noting that
Owens-Corning's trademarked pink insulation is represented by color indicator for
pink or red).
'0 Amsted Indus. v. West Coast Wire Rope & Rigging, Inc., 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1755, 1759 (Trademark Trial & Appeal Bd. 1987). The description of the trademark
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customer confusion because an applicant for registration is not
obliged to submit any evidence in defense of a trademark in-
fringement claim.6' This paucity of information will likely result
in an overly broad interpretation of the realm of color shade af-
forded protection under the color trademark and hasten the de-
pletion of colors available to competitors.62
B. Color Depletion
The removal of wide bands of colors from those available for
commercial use in order to avoid shade confusion will deplete the
remaining supply of colors and thus make it difficult for market
newcomers to choose an appropriate color. This, in turn, may
prevent market newcomers from competing effectively.63 Al-
though the Supreme Court in Qualitex acknowledged that color
depletion might occur in certain circumstances,' it found this
argument unpersuasive because "it relies on an occasional prob-
lem to justify a blanket prohibition."65  The Court, however,
in the application should describe the color or color combinations of the mark. 37
C.F.R. § 2.35 (1995). Although the Federal Regulation requires the drawing submit-
ted with the trademark application to be a "substantially exact representation of the
mark," 37 C.F.R. § 2.51 (a)(1) (1995), the determination as to the specificity of the
color description is left to the discretion of the Examiner of Trademarks. 37 C.F.R. §
2.35; see 37 C.F.R. § 2.61(b) (1995) (authorizing examiner to require submission of
"such information and exhibits as may be reasonably necessary to the proper ex-
amination of the application").
61 For example, the certificate of registration filed by Qualitex utilized the "yellow
or gold" code lining for their press pads. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co.,
Inc., 13 F.3d 1297, 1301 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
Certificate of Registration No. 1,633,711), rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 1300 (1995). The certifi-
cate defines the pads' coloring as "a particular shade of green gold." Id. A court
would then have to determine whether customer confusion would result from the
addition to the market of a press pad through review of the vague description of
"yellow or gold" in the code lining, clarified only by the examiner's determination
that "a particular shade of green-gold" constituted a "substantially exact represen-
tation of the mark." See Amsted, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1760 (noting lack of provision in
trademark registration for differentiation among hues created presumption that
subsequently alleged infringer's product coloring could be anywhere within range of
color provided by lining, including exact shade utilized by trademarked product).
See infra notes 63-84 and accompanying text (discussing color depletion theory).
6 See supra note 14 and accompanying text (discussing color depletion theory).
"Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 115 S. Ct. 1300, 1306 (1995) (providing for
possibility that color depletion problems will arise); see also Brunswick Corp. v.
British Seagull Ltd., 35 F.3d 1527, 1532 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (explaining that color de-
pletion theory is not per se bar to color mark registration but is factor in determi-
nation of whether trademark hinders competition), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1426
(1995).
Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1306.
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failed to recognize the widespread potential for the problems66
that will result from its relegation of the color depletion issue
solely to the protection of the functionality doctrine."
The Court began its analysis by asserting that "hundreds of
color pigments are manufactured and thousands of colors can be
obtained by mixing."68 While experts have estimated that, under
ideal viewing conditions, a normal eye can distinguish about ten
million different colors,69 such numbers are meaningless if the
customer never gets the chance to make a side by side compari-
son of the two products.7" When forced to rely on memory or an
advertisement,71 customers use names to distinguish between
66 Id. (explaining that when color serves as mark, normally alternative colors will
likely be available for similar use by others). The Court cited by way of example the
case of Owens-Corning pink insulation. See id. at 1304. In that unusual case,
Owens-Corning was the only manufacturer of all the producers to color its insula-
tion. In re Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 774 F.2d 1116, 1122 (Fed. Cir. 1985). In
the insulation industry, use of color on a product was the exception, while in the
press pad industry, such coloration was the norm. Compare id. (finding no evidence
in record of widespread industry practice of dyeing insulation color different from
that obtained in manufacturing process) with Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co.,
21 U.S.P.Q.2d 1457, 1458 (C.D. Cal. 1991) (stating other manufacturers have used
various colors on press pads for decades), rev'd in part, affd in part, 13 F.3d 1297
(9th Cir. 1994), rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 1300 (1995).
67 "[Tlhe fact that sometimes color is not essential to a product's use or purpose
and does not affect cost or quality - indicates that the doctrine of 'functionality'
does not create an absolute bar to the use of color alone as a [trade]mark." Qualitex,
115 S. Ct. at 1304; see also, Newman, supra note 36, at 1600 ("Functional features
may not be protected under trademark law, because doing so would defeat the pat-
ent law's goals of giving inventors only a limited monopoly over their inventions and
refusing protection of inventions that are either obvious or insufficiently innova-
tive.").
68 Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1305 (citing L. CHESKIN, COLORS: WHAT THEY CAN Do
FOR You 47 (1947)).
69 See AGOSTON, supra note 46, at 101 (citation omitted) ("It is estimated that a
normal eye can distinguish about 10 million different colors and that in ordinary
commerce about a half million different colors are recognized."); EvANs, supra note
49, at 184 (citing possibility of ten million different perceived colors). But see
AGOSTON, supra note 46, at 41 ("[iun a color circle that contains 192 colors, the dif-
ference between the hues of adjacent colors is hardly perceptible.").
70 Newman, supra note 36, at 1614 (asserting purchaser who never gets chance to
make side by side comparison "is more likely to be fooled by an infringer's similar
shade.").
71 For example, advertisements of Owens-Corning Fiberglas insulation discussed
"how homeowners can cut the high cost of fuel if they would only 'add another layer
of pink' in their attics." In re Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 774 F.2d 1116, 1126
(Fed. Cir. 1985). Additionally, "[flurther evidence of promotion of 'pink' was submit-
ted in the form of a transcript of a radio commercial. The text included, 'if you'd like
to keep your house warmer in winter, cooler in summer ... you'll love that pink.'" Id.
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different colors.72 Although several hundred color names exist
theoretically,73 the color terms that account for the majority of all
color references in common usage may number as few as
twelve.74
Other factors may further limit the number of available col-
ors. In the context of any particular product, customer appeal
makes only certain colors appropriate." Additionally, the manu-
facturer of a color-trademarked product may find it difficult to
ensure the consistency of a shade, thereby necessitating a
broader range of protected colors.76 These factors, coupled with
the removal of colors to avoid problems of shade confusion, will
deny competitive options to industry newcomers.77
In justifying its rejection of the color depletion argument,
the Court unreasonably relied on the ability of the functionality
doctrine to overcome such problems. 78 The functionality doctrine
72 EVANS, supra note 49, at 229 (explaining that "[t]o the naive observer two colors
are different if he calls them by different names"). The number of available color
names is obviously fewer than the list of distinguishable colors. Id. at 230. The color
name "Royal Blue," for example, "can refer to nearly twenty thousand distinguish-
able colors." Newman, supra note 36, at 1610. Although different groups may use
the same color terms, they may be referring to decidedly different colors. EVANS,
supra note 49, at 231.
73 AGOSTON, supra note 46, at 101-02 (stating that National Bureau of Standards
presented list of 267 standardized color names that apply to colors of nonluminous
materials); EVANS, supra note 49, at 230 (referring to workable system for system-
atic naming of surface colors which has only 319 divisions).
74 See EVANS, supra note 49, at 230 (noting that of 4,416 color terms used in sur-
vey of seventeen best selling novels, 4,081 were accounted for by only twelve terms).
Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 115 S. Ct. 1300, 1305-06 (1995); see also
NutraSweet Co. v. Stadt Corp., 917 F.2d 1024, 1028 (7th Cir. 1990) ("NutraSweet
contends that the accepted market understanding is that pastel blue means 'Equal,'
pink means 'Sweet 'N Low' and yellow means 'Sugar Twin'"), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct.
1640; Campbell Soup Co. v. Armour & Co., 175 F.2d 795, 798 (3d Cir.) ("[T]he evi-
dence shows those [colors] suitable for light products, such as milk, are even more
limited.") (quoting Pacific Coast Condensed Milk Co. v. Frye & Co., 85 Wash. 133,
141 (1915), cert. denied, 70 S. Ct. 88 (1949)).
7 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Tallman Conduit, 149 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 656,
658 (Trademark Trial & Appeal Bd. 1966) (finding colored product may vary from
deep reddish orange to light orange, which is virtually indistinguishable from com-
petitor's gold color); JUDD & WYSZENCKI, supra note 46, at 461 (stating that system
which yields desired color only at great expense must be discarded). No one knows
exactly what a commercial color match is. Id. at 36. Each company, therefore, must
seek a compromise between simplicity of formulation and accuracy of resulting
color. Id. at 461. But see id. at 2 (explaining color tolerances on trademarked con-
tainers must be remarkably small to ensure customer loyalty).
7See e.g., NutraSweet, 917 F.2d at 1028 (arguing that allowing color alone to be
trademarked will deter new entrants from entering market).
78 Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1306 (stating that functionality doctrine is available to
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forbids trademarking a product's feature where doing so would
place a competitor at a significant disadvantage because that
feature is "essential to the use or purpose of the article" or
"affects its cost or quality."7" The Court, therefore, reasoned that
the functionality doctrine deters interference with legitimate
competition through "actual or potential" use of color, an impor-
tant product ingredient.0
The Court failed to identify clearly whether the competitive
need for color in a particular market should be determined by
present demand or future need.8 The inclusion of the words
prevent anti-competitive consequences of color depletion).
79 Id.; Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 850-51 n.10 (1982) ("In
general terms, a product feature is functional if it is essential to the use or purpose
of the article or if it affects the cost or quality of the article."); see Sears, Roebuck &
Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 232-33 (1964) (holding that state may not prohibit
copying of article or award damages for such copying when article is neither pat-
ented nor copyrighted); Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 122 (1938)
("Sharing in the goodwill of an article unprotected by patent or trademark is the ex-
ercise of a right possessed by all ... ."). Courts have regularly invoked the functional-
ity doctrine to deny protection to specific colors. See also Inwood Labs., 456 U.S. at
853, 857 n.20 (finding colors of prescription drugs serve function by identifying type
of medication); Brunswick Corp. v. British Seagull Ltd., 35 F.3d 1527, 1529 (Fed.
Cir. 1994) (explaining black color of outboard engines serves function of making en-
gines appear smaller and matching variety of boat colors), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
1426 (1995); Nor-Am Chem. Co. v. 0. M. Scott & Sons Co., 4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1316,
1320 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (finding blue color of fertilizer functional because it indicates
presence of nitrogen); Deere & Co., v. Farmhand, Inc., 560 F. Supp. 85, 91-92 (S.D.
Iowa 1982) (stating that green shade of farm machinery is functional since farmers
want equipment to match), affd, 721 F.2d 253 (8th Cir. 1983).
8o Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1306; see supra note 67 and accompanying text
(discussing functionality doctrine). A recently developed test for determining the
functionality of a product feature involves three parts: (1) whether a particular de-
sign has superior utility; (2) whether alternative designs are available; and (3)
whether the design is especially economical. In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671
F.2d 1332, 1340-41 (C.C.P.A. 1982); Nancy L. Clarke, Issues in the Federal Registra-
tion of Flavors As Trademarks For Pharmaceutical Products, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV.
105, 112 (1993). In the case of color depletion in a particular market, the functional-
ity doctrine would take effect because alternative colors would not be available.
Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1306.
8' See Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1305-06. The conflicting views of the color depletion
theory might be termed the current competitive need view and the future competi-
tive need view. Donald M. Hill, Jr., Protection For Trademarks Consisting of Color
Alone: Master Distributors, Inc. v. Pako Corp., 986 F.2d 219 (8th Cir. 1993), 63 U.
CIN. L. REV. 989, 998-1001 (1995). The current competitive need view maintains
that when the current number of available colors greatly exceeds the number of
competitors in the market, then no competitive need exists for the color seeking pro-
tection and it can be trademarked. Id.; see In re Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 774
F.2d 1116, 1122 (Fed. Cir. 1985). The future competitive need view, however, holds
that a competitive need would necessarily arise when new manufacturers enter the
market, despite the number of currently available colors, if current manufacturers
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"actual or potential" in the decision suggests that courts should
consider prospective competitors' needs." Courts, however, lack
the clairvoyance necessary to accurately predict the likelihood of
future competitors in a particular market.' If the functionality
doctrine protects future competitors, one might easily justify a
ban on color trademarks in virtually all markets.'
II. SHOULD THE COURT HAVE PROTECTED QUALITEX'S
TRADEMARK?
Even if in some instances the colors available to industry
newcomers are plentiful and the potential competitive need is
slim enough to justify extending the Lanham Act's trademark
protection to color alone,' it is submitted that the Court erred in
upholding Qualitex's trademark based on the particular facts of
the case. The district court found other manufacturers of dry
cleaning press pads have used the colors lime green, grey, dark
green, light blue, orange, peach, blue-grey, brown, and other col-
ors on their press pads "for decades."" It is asserted, therefore,
that allowing each of these manufacturers to monopolize and
protect their color of choice will remove shades in the color
ranges of green, blue, grey, brown, and orange from those avail-
able to new competitors interested in entering the press pad
market." The list of available viable colors diminishes further
since the colors of a press pad must be appealing to customers
while still dark enough to camouflage stains.' Manufacturers
attempting to enter the press pad market, therefore, will have
only a limited number of undesirable choices from which to se-
lect a color. Since the functionality doctrine prohibits trade-
are allowed to trademark color alone. See NutraSweet, 917 F.2d at 1028.
82Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1306.
"' See NutraSweet, 917 F.2d at 1028 (stating "there is no way for a court to predict
the likelihood of future competitors in a particular market.").
e See id. ("[lf each of the competitors presently in the tabletop sweetener market
were permitted to appropriate a particular color for its product, new entrants would
be deterred from entering the market.").
' Cf Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1122 (noting that Owens-Coming is only manu-
facturer of insulation that colors its product and there are only small number of
producers).
8' Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1457, 1458 (C.D. Cal.
1991), rev'd in part, affd in part, 13 F.3d 1297 (9th Cir. 1994), rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 1300
(1995).
"'See supra notes 40-62 and accompanying text (discussing broad range of pro-
tection required as result of shade confusion problems).
8 See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 115 S. Ct. 1300, 1305-06 (1995).
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marking a color where doing so would actually or potentially in-
terfere with legitimate competition,89 and since allowing press
pad manufacturers to protect color may potentially interfere
with legitimate competition, the Court should have rejected
Qualitex's trademark.
CONCLUSION
By holding that the Lanham Act extends trademark protec-
tion to color alone, the Supreme Court, in Qualitex Co. v. Jacob-
son Products Co., ignored the potential for unfair competition in
some markets. The granting of trademark status to color alone
will only effectively protect sellers' reputations and consumer
expectations of quality if it includes a wide range of similar col-
ors to avoid problems of shade confusion. Removal of such
shades of color from those available for commercial use could
deplete the supply of suitable colors and thereby prohibit market
newcomers from effectively competing in the protected industry.
Although the Lanham Act is intended to protect consumer expec-
tations of product quality, such protection should not be permit-
ted to interfere with fair competition.
Jean Hayes Kearns
89 Id. at 1306 (stating trademark doctrine of functionality normally would seem
available to prevent anti-competitive consequences).
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